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ABSTRACT 
As required by constitutional principle XVI, government in South Afriea is 
structured at national, provincial and local levels (subsequentty redesignated 
"spheres"). The inference to be drawn from this requirement is that each sphere 
of government will be a worthy one, charged with responsibilities appropriate to 
that sphere. The article highlights the importance of the assignment of 
responsibilities in relation to the country's system of government and 
administration, before proceeding to a critical examination of the assignment 
scheme that is operative in ~outh Africa at present. A theoretical model for the 
assignment of responsibilities to the spheres of government is presented, 
against the background of various shortcomings evinced by the present 
scheme, and in the light of wider research into the assignment question. The 
model making a contribution to a Public Administration approach incorporates a 
proposed technical language, a purpose-specific classification scheme, a 
number of principles which are assumed to be valid, and a particular 
methodology. 
ADMINISTP.A TIO PUBLICA VOLUME 1 S NO 1 NOVEMBER 2007 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
In the vast majority of states, more than one level or sphere of government has 
been found necessary for the performance of the multitudinous activities 
required for the satisfaction of community needs. The plurality of governments 
in a state has far-reaching implications for its system of government and 
administration. The key question which arises is how the responsibilities for the 
performance of public functions are, or perhaps should be, distributed among 
the various levels or spheres of government. Despite the obvious importance of 
the distribution or assignment of such responsibilities from both a political and 
an administrative perspective, there is a paucity of scientific knowledge 
concerning the phenomenon. In South Africa, the movement to a totally new 
constitutional dispensation in the recent past served inter alia to underline the 
fundamental importance of the assignment question. The present article looks 
at the assignment question from a Public Administration perspective and 
presents a possible theoretic approach to dealing with this matter. 
TERMINOLOGY 
Some key terms need to be elucidated briefly at this point; these are "public 
function", "levels or spheres of government", and "Public Administration". 
Public function 
Although various authors have defined the term "public function" (Cloete 1995: 
33; Fox & Meyer 1995: 33; Boles et al. 1996: 297-302), in this article the 
following formal definition of the term "public function" is proposed: "A complex, 
logically inclusive composite of activities undertaken by one or more 
government departments, or other public Institutions, and which is directed at 
the satisfaction of a particular need of the community. or part of the community". 
Colloquially stated, a public function is something which a government 
department or other form of public institution does, a programme it carries out, 
or a service it renders (Robson 2006: 69-72). 
ADMINISTRATIO PUBLICA VOLUME 15 NO 1 NOVEMBER 2007 
3 
Levels or spheres of government 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 dispensed with the well-
known term "levels of government" - with reference to the national, provincial 
and local governments - and replaced it with the term "spheres of government" 
(Robson 2006: 73-74). For purposes of discourse on the assignment of 
governmental responsibilities, these two terms are considered to be 
interchangeable. 
Publ ic Administration 
The convention established in South African academic circles of spelling Public 
Administration with a capital "P" and a capital "A" when referring to the 
discipline or science based on the study of public institutions and their activities 
- vide for example Marais (1993: 118-1 19); Wessels (1999: 365, 369); and 
Pauw (1999: 9) - is followed in the present article. There is therefore a 
particular reality or practice (public administration) and a science based on that 
reality or practice (Public Administration). 
IMPORTANCE OF THE ASSIGNMENT QUESTION 
The assignment of responsibilities to governments is important, in the first 
place, as it is tantamount to the distribution of executive and legislative authority 
within the state. Secondly, it sets in place a basic structure for representative 
government, with concomitant arrangements for the exercising of political power 
at or in the respective levels or spheres of government. The content and the 
limits of governmental authority, as well as the power relationships between 
governments at or in the various levels or spheres of government, are 
determined , thus providing clarity as to the legally permissible role of each 
government. In the process. the task of governing the country is divided up and 
the portions spread vertically and horizontally throughout the state. As the 
assignment of responsibilities is accompanied by the fixing of accountability, the 
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locus of accountability in respect of any particular public function can be 
determined, and the process of enforcing accountability facilitated. 
The performance of public functions has a determining influence on public 
attitudes to government. Public acceptance and, ideally, public appreciation, of 
the structures and functioning of government will be enhanced to the extent that 
there is a general perception that political power has been effectively harnessed 
in the service of the community, and that the distribution of power among the 
various levels or spheres of government is sensible in terms of the kinds of 
needs to be satisfied at each level or in each sphere. An assignment scheme 
can affect, either positively or negatively, the general perception among 
members of the public at large of the relative closeness or remoteness, 
accessibility or inaccessibility, responsiveness or unresponsiveness of 
government. 
' The assignment of responsibilities to governments determines to a large extent 
the structures and processes of the country's public administration. The 
assignment decided upon provides the basis for the design of organisational 
structures at or in the various levels or spheres of government, and determines 
the need for and the nature of intergovernmental arrangements. In financial 
administration, the assignment scheme determines the size and shape of 
national, provincial and local budgets, and provides the basis for revenue 
sharing as well as auditing and the enforcement of accountability. In human 
resource management, the assignment of responsibilities determines the 
deployment of public servants throughout the country, as members of either a 
single public service or a pfurality of public services. 
The conclusion to be reached is that the assignment of responsibilities is of 
fundamental importance to a country, providing the raison d'etre for the 
authorities instituted at or in the various levels or spheres, and giving direction 
and coherence to the manifold activities in the public domain of the state. 
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THE EMPIRICAL SITUATION 
Exploratory research has been done into the assignment of responsibilities in a 
selection of other countries; these are Australia, Belgium, Germany, Spain and 
the United Kingdom (Australia Constitution: Blaustein & Flanz (eds) 1971 , 1991; 
Ryden 1991: 63; the Belgian Constitution; Senelle 1990; the German 
Constitution; the Spanish Constitution; Scotland Act, 1998; Government of 
Wales Act, 1998). In all five countries, responsibility for the performance of the 
public functions concerning defence, foreign affairs and public finance is 
assigned to the highest level of government; as regards other public functions. 
there is no obvious uniformity evident as to the assignment of responsibilities to 
the various levels or spheres of government. The various assignment schemes 
are focused generally on the national level of government and the level 
immediately below the national level. Constitutional provisions concerning local 
government are sparse, with local government being regulated essentially by 
laws enacted by higher levels of government. Taxonomically viewed, the 
treatment of the assignment of responsibilities is generally poor. Matters for 
which various governments are responsible are listed without categorisation 
and in no particular order: the language used in referring to matters lacks 
precision and consistency: references are mostly to subjects (for example, 
"education") rather than to public functions (for example "the provision of 
education"): and there is little sign of an effort to deal systematically with the 
reality that many public functions are deployed over more than one level or 
sphere of government (Robson 2006: 93-123). An outstanding feature of the 
various assignment schemes is that of complexity, with the resultant problem of 
accessibility encountered by anyone wishing to know what each level or sphere 
of government is actually responsible for. The general conclusion reached from 
the research was that none of the countries studied have achieved a clear, 
comprehensive formal demarcation of governmental responsibilities. 
Concerning the assignment scheme that is operative in South Africa at present, 
the die was largely cast by the 1993 Constitution, but with a significant degree 
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of elaboration in the 1996 (present) Constitution. To be of force and effect the 
text of the latter Constitution had to be certified by the Constitutional Court as 
complying with a set of constitutional principles incorporated in the earlier 
constitution as its schedule 4 (1993 Constitution: section 71 ); this the Court did 
at the second time of asking (CC 1996a, 1996b). Of the thirty-four constitutional 
principles adopted, eleven have a bearing on the assignment of responsibilities 
(these numbers are I, VI, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXll , XXlll, XXIV and 
XXXIV). However, on examination it will be found that the principles are not 
formulated as principles per se; the set of statements could be described more 
accurately as a set of specifications to be complied with in drafting a 
constitution. Nevertheless, a number of actual principles are to be discerned in 
the formulations; these are the principle of national unity, the principle of 
economic unity, the principle of equality, the principle of provincial autonomy, 
the principle of co-operation, and the principle of cultural self-determination 
(Robson 2006: 174-179). 
Moving on to the assignment scheme as such, Parliament has the authority to 
make laws concerning any matter, subject to certain provisos as stipulated in 
the Constitution (1996 Constitution: section 44). The Constitution devotes a 
chapter (chapter 11) to the public functions of defence, police, and national 
intelligence, which are referred to as "security services". The defence function 
and the national intelligence function are established clearly by the Constitution 
as the responsibility of the national government (sections 200-204, 209-210). 
The Constitution goes into some detail regarding the resi;ective responsibilities 
of the national and the provincial spheres of government in relation to the 
policing function (sections 205-208); however, on analysis, it is apparent from 
the research (Robson 2006: 250-253) that the basic responsibility for policing is 
vested in the national government, with the provinces cast essentially in an 
oversight role. 
As far as the provincial sphere of government generally is concerned, the 
Constitution assigns to provincial legislatures both a concurrent competence 
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(with Parliament) in respect of stipulated functional areas and local government 
matters, and an exclusive competence in respect of certain other functional 
areas and local government matters (section 104(1 )(b)). The scope of the 
concurrent category (thirty-three functional areas plus certain local government 
matters) is substantially wider than that of the exclusive category (twelve 
functional areas plus certain local government matters} (vide schedules 4 and 5 
of the Constitution}. 
The utilisation of the concurrent powers mechanism raises the obvious question 
of legislative prevalence: Should Parliament and a provincial legislature make a 
law in regard to the same matter, whose law will prevail , and in what 
circumstances will it prevail? The Constitution answers this question by 
stipulating that national legislation will prevail if any of a number of conditions 
should obtain (section 146(2)), or if the national legislation is aimed at 
preventing unreasonable action by a province (section 146(3)). In professional 
parlance, the barriers to provincial legislative competence inherent in the 
provisions of sections 146(2) and (3) have come to be known as the "national 
overrides". The reach of the national overrides is noticeably wide, as is evident 
from the umbrella stipulation that national legislation will prevail if it deals with a 
matter that cannot be "regulated effectively" by the provinces. The functioning of 
the concurrent powers mechanism may be such as to inhibit the provinces in 
the exercising of their powers (vide Pattie 2001 and Murray 2001: 68-69}. 
As regards the exclusive legislative competence of the provinces, the 
competence given is not absolute, but conditional. Parliament may intervene in 
regard to a functional area or local government matter in the exclusive category 
when it is necessary in order to maintain national security, to maintain economic 
unity, to maintain essential national standards, to establish minimum standa.rds 
required for the rendering of services, or to prevent unreasonable action taken 
by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of another province or of the 
country as a whole (1996 Constitution: section 44(2)}. 
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Concerning the involvement of the national and provincial governments in the 
affairs of local governments, such involvement is limited to the extent set ou\ in 
section 155(6)(a) and (7) of the Constitution. Section 155(6)(a) obligates a 
provincial government to provide for the monitoring and support of local 
government in the province "by legislative or other measures". Section 155(7) 
involves the national government as well, and. employing somewhat vague and 
convoluted language, stipulates that the national and provincial governments 
" ... have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective 
performance by municipalities of their functions tn respect of matters listed in 
schedules 4 and 5, by regulating the exercising by municipalities of their 
executive authority ... ". 
One may be forgiven for asking, what does all this mean in practical (public 
administration) terms? 
The Constitution differs markedly from its precursors in providing lists of all 
matters which typically are or should be the responsibility of municipalities. The 
legislative and executive powers of local government are dealt with in a single 
section of the Constitution (section 156). Section 156(1) stipulates that a 
municipality has executive authority in respect of. and the right to administer, 
the listed local government matters referred to supra, as well as any other 
matters assigned to it in terms of national or provincial legislation. Only in the 
following section (section 156(2)) does the Constitution address the legislative 
authority of local governments by stipulating that a municipality may make and 
administer bylaws for the effective administration of the matters which it has 
"the right to administer". 
The distribution of legislative authority between the spheres of government 
constitutes only part of the assignment scheme, albeit a fundamental part. 
Extensive provision is made in the Constitution for a "higher" sphere of 
government to assign or delegate somo of its powers to a "lower" sphere. 
These provisions cover both legislative and executive powers (vide for example 
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sections 44(1 )(a)(iii). 104(1)(c), 99 and 126). To obtain an accurate picture of 
the substance of the responsibilities of the respective spheres of government, 
one would have to embark on detailed research into the assignments and 
delegations operative at a specific point in time. The basic question to be 
answered remains, who does what? - And the answer is not readily apparent. 
In evaluating the assignment scheme. it is insightful to look first at certain 
conceptual and technical aspects. 
Conceptually, a functional area - as employed in the Constitution in relation to 
the area of concurrent powers - is not a function , and specifically not a public 
function. A public function, as defined supra, is essentially an action. or an 
activity, or a set of activities aimed at the satisfaction of a community need - it is 
something which is done. One cannot "do" agriculture, or the environment, or 
health services, or housing - which are all listed as functional areas in schedule 
4 of the Constitution. In public administration one could, for example, promote 
agriculture or render health services, and assign such activities as a 
responsibility to be discharged by one or more public institutions. By contrast, a 
functional area as treated in the Constitution has the appearance of a subject. A 
subject - to follow the Concise Oxford Dictionary - is something which can be 
discussed or described or represented, or which could be treated or dealt with, 
but not something which can be done. Use of the term "functional area" 
therefore tends to obfuscate rather than to provide clarity as to the respective 
responsibilities of the three spheres of government One serious consequence 
is that the reality that many of the major public functions - like those mentioned 
above - cannot be performed effectively by a single sphere of government, but 
required the involvement of all three spheres, remains veiled when it should be 
apparent. At a technical level, a major shortcoming has already been alluded to, 
viz a listing of functional areas coupled to a mechanism of concurrent powers 
provides no clarity as to the public functions or aspects of public functions which 
the national and provincial legislatures can legislate about. Some of the 
functional areas listed in schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution are qualified by 
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limitations of exclusion, subjection and restriction, while others are not qualified 
in any way, when conceivably they should carry some form of qualification. The 
use of the prefixes "provincial" and "municipal" in referring to some - but not all 
- functional areas and matters entrusted to the provinces and municipalities, as 
listed in schedule 5 of the Constitution. is technically puzzling and would appear 
to be unnecessary. 
The Constitution provides a measure of legal certainty as to the powers and 
functions of the key role-players in government, and its provisions would seem 
to be amenable to legal interpretation should any dispute arise in the particular 
area. Conceptually and technically, however, all this comes at the price of a 
high level of complexity. To ascertain what the Constitution has to say about 
public functions requires a concerted effort; the provisions in question are 
neither readily accessible nor easily comprehensible. 
As regards the realisation of assignment principles (vide supra), the Constitution 
presents a generally satisfactory picture, although some caveats need to be 
raised. Evidently, the principle of national unity, the principle of economic unity 
and the principle of equality have been fully realised (Robson 2006:209-10). 
The principle of provincial autonomy has been realised in the Constitution only 
to a limited extent. By its very nature. autonomy cannot be found in the 
mechanism of concurrent powers. Then again, as regards exclusive powers, it 
has been pointed out above that in this instance, exclusivity is a relative 
concept; the fact of the matter is that the national government can intervene in 
the "exclusive" category, albeit only to achieve a specified objective related to 
the national interest. The principle of co-operation is fully realised in the 
Constitution, indeed it could be· said to be a cornerstone of the Constitution. 
Essentially, the Constitution requires the spheres of government to respect one 
another's powers, not to assume powers and functions and, in the exercise of 
their powers and the performance of their functions. not to encroach on one 
another's geographical. functional or institutional integrity. They are required to 
co-operate with one another and to strive to avoid legal proceedings against 
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one another (Constitution: section 41). While these are worthy sentiments, the 
opinion can be ventured that co-operative government ought not to be seen as 
a means of remedying inherent defects and shortcomings in the assignment 
scheme. The principle of cultural self-determination was already embodied in 
the 1993 Constitution, although not initially and in a token manner, with the 
provision for a Volkstaat Council (1993 Constitution: chapter 11A). The present 
Constitution, under a heading "Self-determination", holds out the possibility of 
cultural self-determination not only to the proponents of a Volkstaat, but to any 
community sharing a common cultural and language heritage (section 235). The 
recognition given to the principle is still passive and conditional; cultural self-
determination is clearly not a cornerstone of the country's constitutional 
arrangements (Robson 2006: 259-61 ). 
Moving on to the substance of the responsibilities assigned to the spheres of 
government, it needs to be stated at the outset that it is a well-nigh impossible 
task to obtain a complett; and accurate picture in this respect. The reasons for 
this unsatisfactory state of affairs are examined below. 
The centrepiece of the assignment of responsibilities to the national and 
provincial spheres of government is the mechanism of concurrent powers, a 
mechanism which has been found to be highly problematic by various authors -
vide De Villiers (1996: 6-7, 9, 37), Levy and Tapscott (2001: 2, 6), Laufer (1991: 
91-94), Pettie (2001) and Murray (2001 : 68-69). The wide scope of the national 
overrides applicable to concurrent powers, which has the effect of masking the 
actual extent of the provinces' legislative powers, has already been pointed out 
supra. The key question to be answered is: Do the constitutional provisions 
regarding concurrent legislative powers provide sufficient clarity as to the public 
function responsibilities to be discharged by the national and provincial 
governments respectively? From a public administration point of view the 
answer is "No". As far as exclusive provincial powers are concerned, it has 
already been pointed out that these powers are conditional; the scope for 
Parliament to intervene is notably wide. It is possible that because of this, the 
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provinces. as in the case of concurrent powers (vide supra) , may be inhibited in 
the exercising of their legislative powers in the exclusive powers category. 
Again, as in the case of concurrent powers, it is not possible to ascertain 
unambiguously on a reading of the Constitution what in practical (public 
administration) terms the provinces may or may not do in relation to functional 
areas in the exclusive category. Extending the search for substance to the local 
sphere of government, the subordinate status of local government is 
immediately apparent. The emphasis of the Constitution is on the administration 
of matters by the municipalities, with the making of bylaws a clearly 
supplementary responsibility (vide section 156 of the Constitution). It is certainly 
municipal executive rather than legislative activity which is the focus of the 
supporting and oversight roles to be performed by the national and provincial 
governments respectively in terms of section 155(6)(a) and (7) of the 
Constitution (vide supra). In the light of the situation as sketched, the general 
conclusion that the essential purpose of local government is to provide services 
, 
in line with national or provincial legislation, is inescapable. If the true measure 
of substance in relation to the assigned responsibilities of a sphere of 
government is the extent of its own (original) legislative authority, the 
municipalities have received a noticeably meagre serving. 
In summary, the Constitution employs a number of basic mechanisms for 
ordering the responsibilities of the spheres of government, viz concurrent 
powers for the national and the provincial spheres, qualified exclusive powers 
for the provincial sphere, regulatory oversight by the national and provincial 
spheres over fhe local government sphere, and utilisation of the local sphere in 
an essentially administrative role. In addition, and in line with the principle of co-
operative government, ample provision is made for the assignment and 
delegation of responsibilities between the spheres of government. The resultant 
substance of each sphere's responsibilities is a function of the interaction of 
these mechanisms. However, while particular mechanisms can be examined, 
described and evaluated, it is not possible, without embarking on a great deal of 
detailed research, to obtain a reasonably accurate picture of the actual 
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substance of the responsibilities which each sphere of government is called 
upon to discharge. The Constitution does not of itself provide a credible and 
clear-cut deployment of responsibilities over the three spheres of government. 
In general it can be said that the primary power of the state, viz the power to 
direct and oversee the functioning of society by the making of laws, is located 
predominantly with the national government. while the legislative roles to be 
fulfilled by the sub national spheres of government are essentially 
supplementary ones. As far as the exercising of executive authority is 
concerned, the constitutional provision for the deployment of responsibilities for 
the rendering of services and the carrying out of programmes seems to be such 
as to ensure that all three spheres are involved in a substantial manner. 
AN ASSIGNMENT SCIENCE? 
Given the importance of the assignment question (vide supra), one may well 
ask, To what extent is a scientific approach to the question in evidence? 
Following Mouton (1996: 9-11) and Wessels (1999: 365 and 377), the following 
set of basic criteria may be used to constitute a scientific approach {Robson 
2006: 292-8): 
• Viewed generally, is there a distinct body of knowledge, characterised by 
components such as own concepts, typologies, explanatory theories, 
models, and paradigms in existence, and is there a group of people that 
possesses this knowledge and 1s contributing to its increase? 
• Has the object of study, public functions, been clearly identified and defined? 
• Is there an established conceptual framework or standardised terminology, 
properly defined, which can facilitate discourse on the assignment question? 
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Are there established typologies or classifications of public functions aimed 
specifically at the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of 
government for their performance? 
Is there a discernible paradigm which applies specifically to the study of 
public functions. or aspects of public functions. as assigned to levels or 
spheres of government as their responsibility? 
Given that true scientific endeavour consists not only in the observation, 
description and classification of phenomena. but also in a concerted effort to 
understand phenomena, what propositions of an explanatory nature have 
been, or can be, put forward concerning the assignment of responsibilities, 
whether in the form of postulates or principles, models, hypotheses or other 
forms ottheory? 
l\n assessment has been done of the literature with a bearing on the study 
which includes post-graduate dissertations and theses presented at South 
l\frican universities, the published reports of research institutes and other 
bodies which have produced research reports, books and journal articles in 
Public Administration and Constitutional Law (Robson 2006: 26-56), by means 
)f the abovementioned criteria. This assessment has shown that a scientific 
3pproach to the assignment question is in evidence only to a limited degree. A 
j1stinct, dedicated body of knowledge is not apparent; the particular 
)henomenon is under-researched; expertise concerning the matter is not 
·eadily available; work remains to be done concerning the identification and 
jefinition of key concepts; a· conceptual framework and standardised 
erminology to facilitate discourse is not readily to hand; an accountable 
:lassification of public functions is not in existence; a particular paradigm for the 
;tudy of the assignment phenomenon has not become established; and little by 
vay of explanatory theory has been put forward. However, the research 
Robson 2006: 299-304) has revealed the presence of a number of principles 
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which would appear to underlie the assignment of public function 
responsibilities. 
PROPOSED THEORETIC MODEL 
Following a Public Administration approach, a theoretic model for the 
assignment of responsibilities to the spheres of government seeks to delineate 
an accountable basis on which responsibilities for the performance of public 
functions can be assigned to sub-national governments. The main features of 
the model are encapsulated below. 
Assumptions 
For purposes of the modelling exercise. four basic assumptions are 
made, viz that while guaranteeing freedom of religion, the state is 
essentially secular; 
• that the state is organised on a geographic basis, with sub-national 
governments focused on provinces and, within provinces. on 
municipalities; 
• that all subnational governments are viable, that is to say that they are 
capable in terms of human and material resources of discharging 
satisfactorily the responsibilities entrusted to them; and (d) that the 
assignment of responsibilities and the functioning of the executive must 
have a statutory foundation. 
A Publlc Administration approach 
T ne proposed model evinces a Public Administration approach (Robson 2006: 
309-316) to the assignment question and it is necessary to examine briefly what 
such an approach entails. Firstly, there has to be adherence to certain value-
based guidelines generally recognised within the discipline (for example Cloete 
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(1994: 63-88) and Botes et al. (1996: part Ill; chapter 5). Three of these 
guidelines are particularly appropriate, viz those regarding political supremacy; 
democratic requirements; and economy, effectiveness and efficiency. 
Secondly, it is necessary to postulate a particular Public Administration view on 
the relationship between community needs, public functions, and government. 
Community needs can be ordered into three major groups, viz the need for 
safety and security, the need for order in societal living, and the need for an 
existence which is commensurate with human dignity. It follows, then, that there 
are three major groups of public functions to be performed by government, viz 
those focused on protection, those focused on regulation (of societal living), and 
those focused on the promotion of socio-economic development respectively. 
By extension, it can be postulated that the purpose of the state is to ensure for 
its people 'an existence that is safe, orderly, and commensurate with human 
dignity. The hypothesis can be advanced that all three spheres of government 
serve essentially the same purpose or, stated more accurately, are jointly and 
severally involved in the realisation of the all-encompassing national purpose, 
viz to ensure for the inhabitants of the country an existence which is safe, 
orderly, and commensurate with human dignity. Obviously the three spheres 
don't - or shouldn't - all do the same things, but there is no denying that all 
three are involved in one way or another in providing protection, maintaining 
order, and promoting an existence commensurate with human dignity. The key 
question to be asked is not which sphere should be responsible for a particular 
public function, but rather to what extent each sphere should be involved in the 
performance of a public function. There is evidently no easy answer to this 
question or a simple "one size fits all" approach which can be applied. Each 
public function would seem to require careful analysis if an accountable 
deployment of responsibility for its performance is to be achieved. 
Finally, the application of a Public Administration approach to the assignment 
question entails that the formalisation in law of the responsibilities of the 
respective spheres of government should be readily accessible. As pointed out 
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supra, the present Conshluhon falls short in this respect, tending to obfuscate 
rather than clarify the roles of the three spheres of government in the 
performance of public functions 
Language 
The study of assignment schemes in South Africa and other countries has 
shown throughout that one of the major shortcomings of such schemes 1s the 
confusing, inconsistent and generally poor use of language in setting out the 
public function responsibilities of levels or spheres of government. The 
proposed model requires its own, dedicated language if it is to be applied 
effectively and accountably. There are two aspects to the language 
requirement, viz the building of a purpose-specific conceptual framework, and 
the employment in a consistent manner of what can be referred to as "public 
function language". As regards the first aspect, it is proposed (Robson 
2006·318-9) that a basic conceptual framework be constructed consisting of the 
concepts "public function", "assignment", "responsibility", "levels or spheres of 
government", "government", "activity", "subsidiary", "control" and "co-
ordination" The conceptual framework is an initial one and can be expanded as 
necessary. 
Moving on to the notion of a "public function language", the claim can be made 
that such a language wrll improve communication about public functions 
substantially. Precision and consistency in language usage can facilitate 
meaningful deliberation of assignment questions, and enhance the acceptability 
and accountability of the decisions taken. 
The main features of the envisaged "public function language" (Robson 2006: 
321-323) are as follows: 
• Public functions are to bd described consistently in terms of an activity or 
composite of activities (e g. "the provision of education") and not in terms of 
a nominal subject (e.g. "education"). 
ADMINISTRATIO PUBLICA VOLUME 15 NO 1 NOVEMBER 2007 
18 
• In setting out public function responsibilities. qualifying phrases are to be 
avoided. 
• The formal description of a public function, or aspect of a public function, 
should consist of a single, concise sentence; should capture as fully as 
possible all the underlying aqtivities of the public function; should include in 
its envelope of meaning only those activities which make up the public 
function, excluding activities which belong to another public function; and 
should be worded so that the average, educated, adult person will readily 
understand on reading the description what the public function entails. 
Classification of public functions 
What is required - bearing in mind that many public functions frequently 
necessitate the involvement of more than one tier of government for their 
effective performance - is a classification of the activities which make up a 
public function into logically differentiated packages of activities which, where 
necessary, could be allocated to different tiers of government. Such a 
classification would be purpose-specific, but that is what classifications are 
intended to be (Copi & Cohen 1990: 450). 
Building on work done by the then Commission for Administration in 1993 (CFA 
1993a, 1993b), the theoretic model includes a fivefold classification of activities 
making up a public function, viz the rendering of a service, the putting in place 
of legislation to authorise and direct the service, the co-ordination of the actions 
of the role-players involved in the rendering of the service, control over their 
actions, and any other activities relating to the service which do not fall within 
the first four classes of activities. The five classes can be designated as "service 
delivery", "legislation'', "co-ordination", "control", and "other activities". The five 
classes of activities are differentiated according to the generic sequence of 
public accountability. It is an assumption of this article that before any service 
can be rendered, legislation must be put in place authorising and specifying the 
service; where necessary the rendering of the service must be co-ordinated; 
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and to ensure compliance with legislative enactments, the rendenng of the 
service must be controlled. A classification scheme as proposed (Robson 2006. 
325-327) can be regarded as rooted in the science of Public Administration, and 
would appear to be compatible with both the legislative and executive arms of 
government. 
Principles to be applied in assigning responsibilities 
The pnnciple of subsidiary has an obvious relevance and utility when decisions 
regarding the assignment of responsibilities to levels or spheres of government 
have to be taken. The principle can be defined as follows: "Higher levels of 
government should perform only those functions which lower level governments 
cannot perform equally well or better" (Robson 2006: 319, after Laufer 1991: 
262). However, there are also other principles, already referred to supra, which 
need to be brought into the reckoning if an accountable deployment of 
responsibilities is to be achieved. 
Where a public function, or aspect of a public function, has a direct and 
substantial bearing on the maintenance of national unity, its performance should 
be assigned to the national government (principle of national unity). If a matter 
has an impact on the economy, the principle of economic unity needs to be 
applied. However, a cautionary note needs to be sounded here: Even where 
there is a convincing argument in favour of placing a responsibility with the 
national government, there may still be a role to be played at a lower level. The 
principle of equality is tied directly to the Bill of Rights (Constitution: Chapter 2) 
and its application implies that individual members of the community should be 
treated equally, at least in so far as the involvement of the state in their lives is 
concerned The principle may point to the national government taking the lead 
in policy-making and legislation, but not necessarily in service delivery, which 
could be devolved to lower levels of government. The principle of co-operation 
recognises the reality that public function responsibilities cannot always be 
assigned with complete precision, and that the spheres of government need to 
Work together where necessary in order to promote the greater good. Almost 
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inevitably, the principle of provincial autonomy will come into the reckoning. The 
key question is not whether there should be sub national autonomy, but rather 
in which areas and to what degree sub national autonomy will be workable and 
generally acceptable. Ultimately, a decision needs to be taken within the 
political domain; however, such a decision would be facilitated if it were founded 
on the results of thorough, theoretically-based analyses. 
Methodology 
The methodology to be employed should be in harmony with the proposed 
public administration approach; should employ the special language considered 
necessary for dealing effectively with the assignment question; should 
incorporate the purpose-specific classification scheme which is proposed; and 
should accord due recognition to the assignment principles which have been 
identified. The main points of such an appropriate methodology (Robson 2006: 
, 
333-343) are summarised below: 
• Identification: The public functions at issue are those which are focused on 
the satisfaction of community needs. Enabling and controlling activities such 
as the compilation and control of budgets, auditing, human resource 
management, and the supply of office and other accommodation are 
excluded. 
• Knowledge acquisition: A public function is invariably vastly more 
complicat~ than may be suggested by its distinguishing name, such as 
"health" or "welfare". To understand a public function, requires thorough 
study by analysts with the training and experience to be able to embark on 
studies of that particular nature. 
• "Bottom to top" approach: Constitutional principle XVI is the shortest of 
the constitutional principles; it states simply that "government shall be 
structured at national. provincial, and local levels". The inference to be 
drawn is that not only the national government but also the provincial and 
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local governments should be worthy governments, democratically elected 
and accountable, and with substantial powers to exercise and functions to 
perform. The best way to ensure that full and proper attention is paid to each 
sphere of government is to look first at the local, then at the provincial and, 
finally, at the national sphere of government. Such an approach resonates 
well with the subsidiary principle (vide supra). 
• Analysis of public functions: The analysis directed at the deployment of 
public function responsibilities should be done in two steps. As a first step 
the existing situation should be established through empirical study, with the 
data concerning the activities of service delivery, legislation, co-ordination 
and control sorted accurately according to the nature of the activity. The 
picture of a public function obtained in this way, should be validated with 
experienced practitioners. In the second step, a proposal needs to be 
developed regarding the manner in which responsibilities for the 
performance of the public function ought to be assigned. This will include in 
the main the identification and definition of the services encompassed by the 
public function, careful consideration of the sphere of government where 
responsibility for a service should be placed, followed by consideration of the 
optimal placement of activities regarding the generation of legislation, co-
ordination, and control associated with the rendering of an identified service. 
A draft proposal should be submitted to officials with a sound knowledge of 
the public function, and finalised with due regard to any comments or 
suggestions received. 
• Formalisation of responsibilities: Because of the fundamental 
(constitutional) importance of the matter, the public function responsibilities 
assigned to the three spheres of government should be incorporated in the 
Constitution. This could best be done by means of an annexure (schedule) 
to the Constitution, setting out the responsibilities - in public function 
language - of the sub national governments, to which the provisions in the 
main text governing legislative and executive powers could be linked. The 
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responsibilities of the national government need not be captured in the . 
schedule, as these could be read into the residuary powers of Parliament. 
A comment on co-operative government would seem to be apposite at this 
juncture. The need for co-operative government will not lapse because the 
assignment question is dealt with in a more scientific manner, nor will the 
principle of co-operative government be invalidated. No assignment scheme 
based on the diverse activities of a multitude of public institutions can be 
expected to achieve a deployment of responsibilities which will be precise and 
complete in every respect; grey areas will remain. However, it can be argued 
that a concerted endeavour to limit as far as possible the areas of uncertainty 
regarding the responsibilities of the respective spheres of government will 
contribute substantially to the strengthening of co-operative government. 
CONCLUSION 
Public Administration as a science, based essentially on the activities of public 
institutions, in other words on what they are given to do, has a fundamental 
interest in the assignment of public function responsibilities. "Fundamental 
interesf' is here understood to be an epistemic (scientific knowledge-building) 
interest. The research into the assignment question (vide Robson 2006) has 
revealed that a scientific approach to the question is in evidence to a limited 
extent. A number of relevant principles have been identified, which, taken and 
applied together, could be said to provide an emerging principled base for 
dealing with the assignment of responsibilities. However, the scope for theory-
building in the particular field is substantial. 
A question to be addressed is whether a theoretic model as proposed can be 
applied in a thoroughgoing, formal redetermination of the public function 
responsibilities of South Africa's three spheres of government. Such a 
redetermination would entail an amendment of the Constitution, and a 
substantial one at that The amendment of the Constitution would have to be 
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preceded by the development of assignment proposals based on an analysis of 
the full spectrum of public functions. The sheer size and complexity of the task 
may militate against its ever being undertaken, although this would be the best 
way of remedying present defects and shortcomings in the assignment scheme. 
However, there is another - even if sub-optimal - way of proceeding. An 
analysis as envisaged in the theoretic model could be done of any public 
function at any time. The exercise would undoubtedly contribute to a better 
understanding of the function and how its performance could best be deployed 
over the spheres of government. Nothing would be lost and much is to be 
gained by such an endeavour. It is also possible to implement real, substantial 
change without necessarily amending the Constitution. This could be done by 
utilising the flexibility built into the Constitution. regarding the exercising of both 
legislative and executive powers by the national and provincial spheres of 
government, to which reference has been made in this article. However, it 
needs to be observed that without a thoroughgoing amendment of the 
Constitution the problems concerning complexity, poor accessibility, and 
substance - so much an unsatisfactory feature of the deployment of public 
function responsibilities in the present Constitution - will remain. 
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